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COMMENTS

Criminal Law-Acquittal of a Principal Does Not
Preclude Conviction of an Aider and Abettor Under
Federal Law
United States v. Standefer*
I. Introduction
In United States v. Standefer the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
undertook the first in-depth determination by a federal court of whether the acquittal of one charged as a sole principal in a criminal act should preclude conviction of an aider and abettor. This question involved the interpretation of a
federal statute, 18 U.S.C. section 2, which provides that one charged as an
aider and abettor in the violation of a federal statute shall be charged as a principal. Although this question has previously arisen in the federal courts, it has
resulted in conflicting interpretations among the circuits.
In an attempt to formulate a decisive answer, the Standefer court considered Congress' intent in drafting an aider and abettor statute of general application, precedents bearing on the question, and relevant policy considerations. The Third Circuit ultimately held that acquittal of the sole principal does
not preclude conviction of one charged as an aider and abettor. 2 A close look at
the decision, however, indicates a need for further clarification, either by the
Congress or the Supreme Court. This comment therefore serves two purposes:
first, to examine the holdiig of the Third Circuit in Standefer, and secondly, to
analyze and evaluate the issue presented in Standefer and its possible ramifications of federal aider and abettor law.
II. Statement of Facts
United States v. Standefer arose out of a series of gifts made by the Gulf Oil
Corporation to an agent of the Internal Revenue Service who was charged with
auditing Gulf's federal income tax returns. From May, 1971, to June, 1974,
Gulf Oil Corporation, through two of its employees, Fred W. Standefer and
Joseph Fitzgerald, supplied a number of gifts to I.R.S. agent Cyril J.
Niederberger and his family. Five of these gifts were in the form of paid vaca3
tions.
Indictments were returned against Gulf Oil Corporation, Standefer,
Fitzgerald and Niederberger. Gulf Oil elected to plead guilty as to certain
counts of the indictment against it, while Fitzgerald entered a plea of nolo con* 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1980) (No.
79_383).
1 610 F.2d 1076 (3d Cir. 1979) (en bane), cert. granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3426 (U.S. Jan. 8, 1980) (No.
79-383).
2 610 F.2d at 1078.
3 Id.
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tendere. Niederberger and Standefer 4each pleaded not guilty to the charges and
elected to have separate jury trials.
The trial of Niederberger, the principal in the case, was held first.
Niederberger was charged with five counts of violating 26 U.S.C. section
7214(a)(2), 5 one count for each of the trips in question. 6 This statute prohibits
an Internal Revenue Service agent from receiving gratuities which in any way
relate to the performance of an official duty. Niederberger was convicted on
two of the five section 7214(a)(2) counts. These convictions were affirmed on
appeal. As to the other three counts of section 7214(a)(2), the jury returned a
7
verdict of not guilty.
The trial of the appellant, Standefer, followed Niederberger's conviction.
Standefer was also charged with five counts of violating section 7214(a)(2),
under the theory that he had aided and abetted Niederberger in accepting the
paid vacations. 8 Although on its face section 7214(a)(2) applies only to misconduct of government employees, it was possible to charge Standefer with violation of this federal law as a result of 18 U.S.C. section 2. 9 The jury convicted
Standefer on all five counts.' 0
On appeal to the Third Circuit, Standefer urged that three of the section
7214(a)(2) counts should have been dismissed because of Niederberger's acquittal on identical charges. Specifically, Standefer argued that as a matter of
law he could not be convicted of aiding and abetting a principal when that principal had been acquitted of committing the charged offense. I I A divided panel
rejected the argument, relying on past decisions of the Third Circuit that permitted the conviction of an aider and abettor even when the principal had been
acquitted. 12 The Slandefer court thereafter ordered rehearing en banc to reconsider its position in prior cases and to reexamine the state of the federal law
4 Id.
5 26 U.S.C. S 7214(a)(2) imposes a criminal sanction against: Any officer or employee of the United
States acting in connection with any revenue law of the United States(2) who knowingly demands other or greater sums than are authorized by law, or receives any fee, compensation, or reward, except as by law prescribed, for the performance of any duty.
6 Niederberger was also charged with five counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 20 1 (g)( 1977), which provides:
Whoever, being a public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official,
otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly
asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receives, or agrees to receive anything of value for
himself or because of any official act performed or to be performed by him;
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
Niederberger was convicted on four of the five § 201(g) counts. The convictibns were affirmed on appeal.
610 F.2d at 1079.
7 United States v. Niederberger, 580 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1979).
8 Standefer was also charged with four counts of violating 18 U.S.C. § 201(f)(1977), a companion provision to § 201(g), which provides:
Whoever, otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or
indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any public official, former public official,
or person selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act performed or to be performed by such public official, former public official, or person selected to be a public official:
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years, or both.
Standefer was convicted on all four § 201(0 counts. The convictions were affirmed on appeal. 610 F.2d at
1078.
9 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1977).
10 610 F.2d at 1078.
11 Id. at 1081.
12 See United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Provenzano, 334
F.2d 678 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964); United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1948).
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respecting aiders and abettors. The court concluded that the outcome of
conviction, and it acNiederberger's prosecution had no effect on Standefer's
13
cordingly affirmed the conviction on all counts.
III. The Congressional Intent in Drafting 18 U.S.C. Section 2
Under federal law, an individual assisting in the commission of a crime
can be charged under 18 U.S.C. Section 2 as if he were a principal. This
statute provides:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another
would be an offense against the United States, is punishable
14
as a principal.
A. The Standefer Interpretation
A critical question raised in the course of the court's en banc consideration
of the case was whether Congress had intended 18 U.S.C. section 2(a) to permit the conviction of an aider and abettor after the principal had been acquitted. 15 In making this determination, the Standefer court initially sought
guidance from analysis of the statute's history. The court first noted that up
until 1909 an accessory to a felony could not be tried at all under federal law
absent an express statutory authorization 6 making the aiding and abetting of
the particular felony a crime in and of itself.17 A federal prosecution for aiding

13 610 F.2d at 1078.
14 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1977).
15 The court also addressed the question of whether 18 U.S.C. S 2 may be used to convict one who
could not be charged as a principal under the substantive criminal statute. The statute under which
Standefer was indicted, 26 U.S.C. 5 7214(a)(2), is limited in its coverage to officers and employees of the
United States. Standefer, a private citizen, argued that the government could not use 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) to
prosecute him as an aider and abettor when he could not have been indicted as a principal for the substantive crime.
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) formerly provided that: "Whoever commits an offense against the United States, or
aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, or procures its commission, is a principal." In 1951, the section
was amended by Section 17B of the Act of October 31, 1951. The phrase "is a principal" was replaced by
"is punishable as a principal." The legislative history discloses that the amendment was "intended to
clarify and make certain the intent to punish aiders and abettors regardless of the fact that they may be incapable of committing the specific violation which they are charged to have aided and abetted." S. Rep. No.
1020, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess. (reprinted in 1951) U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. Serv. 2578, at 2583. Given as
examples were those criminal statutes that "are limited in terms to officers and employees of the Government, judges, judicial officers, witnesses, officers or employees or persons connected with national banks or
member banks." Id.
In light of this expression by the Senate that 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) may be used to convict one who could not
be charged under the substantive statute, Standefer's contention was given limited attention by the Court of
Appeals. 610 F.2d at 1085.
16 It is well established that under federal law there are no common law crimes. United States v. Britton, 108 U.S. 199, 206 (1883); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 211 (1890). The federal courts have
jurisdiction only over actions specifically proscribed by Congress. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7
Cranch) 32 (1812).
17 Set, e.g., United States v. Crane, 25 F.Cas. 691 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 14,888).
The rule differed as to misdemeanors. No specific statutory authorization was necessary to prosecute an
accomplice, and aiders and abettors were chargeable as principals. See United States v. Mills, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 138, 141 (1883); United States v. Snyder, 14 F. 554, 556 (C.C.D. Minn. 1882).
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and abetting required a specific provision, and several such provisions were included among the criminal statutes of the period. 18
By the Act of March 4, 1909, Congress enacted a general provision which
made it a crime to aid or abet the commis sion of any federal offense. 19 The
court in Standefer relied on the congressional history of the Act of March 4,
20
1909, to interpret its successor, 18 U.S.C. section 2(a).
In the Senate Report on the Act of March 4, 1909 the Senate committee
stated its purpose in enacting a general accomplice provision:
The committee has deemed it wise to make those who are accessories before
the fact at common law principal offenders, thereby permitting their indictment and conviction for a substantive offense.
At common law an accessory cannot be tried without his consent before the
conviction or outlawry of the principal except where the principal and the accessory are tried together; if the principal could not be found or if he had been
indicted and refused to plead, had been pardoned or died before conviction,
the accessory could not be tried at all.21This change of the existing law renders
these obstacles to justice impossible.
The Senate, in this somewhat limited explanation of its intent, indicated
that the statute would allow for the conviction of an accomplice even though
the principal could not be found, had failed to plead, was pardoned, or had
died. The situation in which the principal is acquitted was not specifically mentioned. An important question which therefore arose was whether Congress intended to reach only these specific "obstacles to justice" which are set out in
the committee's notes; or whether Congress intended that the statute reach
other unanticipated or unexpressed "obstacles to justice" such as that
presented in Standefer.
The Standefer court concluded that although the Senate Report provided
for the elimination of certain "obstacles to justice" by the proposed statute,
there was no indication that the list was intended to be all-inclusive. 22 The fact
that the committee did not affirmatively set down, in a particular report, its intention to reach the particular class of cases in which a principal is acquitted
was not thought to be determinative of their intent to exclude that class. The
court felt that congressional committees should be expected neither to anticipate every possible application of a general rule, nor to express their desire
to bring about all the applications that are foreseen, since to insist upon an affirmative expression of legislative intent would require a "clairvoyant
legislative report ' 23 and bring many general provisions under unnecessary
scrutiny. Such a requirement, in the majority's view, would have the effect of
18 See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 64, S 45, 4 Stat. 114 (buying stolen mail); R.S. 5 5323 (1878)
(piracy); R.S. S 5427 (1878) (naturalization offenses); R.S. S 5466 (1878) (destroying mail).
19 The Act provided that:
"Whoever directly commits any act constituting an offense defined in any law of the United
States, or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is a principal."
Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1152.
20 The Act of March, 4, 1909, became 5 332 of the penal code, and is presently codified, without
substantive modification, at 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1977).
21 S. Rep. No. 10, pt. 1, 60th Cong., IstSess. 26 (1908).
22 610 F.2d at 1084.
23 Id.
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undermining congressional authority rather than respecting congressional in24
tent.
The court also pointed out that at no time had Congress sought to alter the
seventy-year-old statute in order to create an exception for cases involving the
acquittal of a principal. Since several cases decided in the federal courts during
this period held that the aider and abettor could be convicted notwithstanding
acquittal of the principal, the congressional inaction was interpreted as a state25
ment in support of this position.
Considering all these factors, the majority determined that in drafting this
provision Congress intended to draft an aider and abettor statute of general application. Congress by its enactment, said the court, sought to remove certain
"obstacles to justice" which existed at common law, including, although -not
expressly mentioned, the rule that precluded conviction of an aider and abettor
in cases where the principal was acquitted.
B. Analysis: CongressionalIntent
As previously indicated, the majority in Standefer felt that the rule that
precluded conviction of an aider and abettor in cases where the principal was
acquitted was among the "obstacles to justice" that Congress intended to
eliminate in 18 U.S.C. section 2. Although this particular "obstacle" was not
expressly mentioned in the Senate Report accompanying the legislation, the
court concluded that the list had not been intended to be all-inclusive, therefore
justifying its liberal interpretation of the statute itself. A close scrutiny of the
statute and relevant legislative history, however, reveals that the Standefer majority, in an effort to justify its decision, read more into the statute's history
than was legitimately there.
Judge Aldisert made this point in an opinion, joined in part by Chief
Judge Seitz, in which he concurred in part and dissented in part. Aldisert
argued that the Senate expressed a clear intention to remove only certain impediments to justice. The change in the existing law provided by the statute, he
argued, would render those "obstacles to justice" expressed in the Committee
Report impossible. 2 6 In essence, Judge Aldisert argued that since the report
contained no mention of the situation in which the principal had been acquitted, a doubt arises whether it was intended that the statute apply to such cases.
Thus, the law should be construed strictly, and any ambiguity resolved in favor
of the defendant, since, in Judge Aldisert's opinion, the power of punishment
27
is vested in the legislative, not the judicial department.
Whether the statute and accompanying legislative history resolve the issue
depends largely on the interpretation technique used. If one construes the
statute and other reports strictly, with the understanding that the statute was
intended to cover only those situations expressly enumerated the conclusion
would clearly be that the statute does not cover the situation at issue. Converse24
25
26
27

Id.
Id. at 1084-85.
Id. at 1104 (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id.
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ly, if one gives a broad interpretation to the statute and other reports, with the
understanding that the statute was intended to cover those other situations
reasonably foreseeable, it is possible to conclude that the statute was intended
to allow the conviction of an aider and abettor notwithstanding the acquittal of
the principal.
The Third Circuit reached too far in an attempt to justify its position. The
specific language of the Senate Report indicated that the statute was intended
to remove "these obstacles to justice." The Senate's use of the word "these"
should not have been so readily disregarded. Furthermore, the maxim of
statutory interpretation "expressio unius est exclusio alterius" would preclude such
an expansive interpretation. 28 Thus where a statute enumerates the subjects on
which it is intended to operate, it is to be construed as excluding from its operation all those subjects not expressly mentioned. 29 The Senate Report clearly indicated that it was to remedy the situations where the principal cannot be
found, has failed to plead, was pardoned, or died. 3 0 Since no mention was
made of the situation where the principal was acquitted, the statute should not
be interpreted to cover that situation.
Given the sketchy existence of legislative history and its questionable interpretation one may only speculate as to whether Congress intended to address the situation in which the substantive principal is acquitted. Congress has
not yet provided a clear indication of how the issue should be resolved, and inthe absence of Congressional guidance, interpretation of the statute has
become largely subjective. The effect of this subjective interpretation is
reflected in the divergent positions of the federal court on this issue.
IV. Existing Precedents
Since the situation in Standefer is not easily resolved by reference to either
the text or legislative history of the federal statute, a case law analysis is mandated. The question of whether an aider and abettor can be convicted notwithstanding the acquittal of the sole principal has arisen in numerous situations. A split among the circuits exists however, which the Standefer majority
chose to ignore.
A. Authority Relied on by the Third Circuit
The Third Circuit panel that initially heard Standefer concluded that the
aider and abettor could be convicted even though the principal was acquitted
of committing the charged offense. In reaching this result, the divided panel
relied on a line of Third Circuit precedents that dated back more than thirty
years. 31 In United States v. Klass,32 decided in 1948, the Third Circuit had ruled
that it was immaterial that the actual principal had been acquitted in determin28 This maxim, which is generally applied to the interpretation of statutory language, can be of
assistance in interpreting other Congressional statements.
29 Williams v. Wohlgemuth, 540 F.2d 163 (3d Cir. 1976).
30 Supra note 21.
31 610 F.2d at 1081.
32 166 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1948).
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ing whether the aider and abettor could still be charged with the substantive offense. The court reasoned in Klass that "each participant must stand on his
own two feet" 3 3 therefore denying the defendant the benefit of any prior acquittal. This same rationale was applied in United States v. Provenzano3 4 to affirm
the conviction of an aider and abettor despite acquittal of the principal.
In United States v. Bryan.3 5 a relatively recent decision, the court refused to
acquit an aider and abettor, proven to be a participant in a crime, when there
was insufficient evidence to convict the principal. The crime charged in Bryan
was the theft of whiskey, a charge which required a showing of criminal intent
to steal. The trier of fact found that the principal, referred to as an "innocent
dupe," had committed the act in question, but lacked the requisite intent.
Without this necessary element, the principal was acquitted. The same court
found, however, that the aider and abettor had possessed the necessary
criminal intent, and therefore convicted him. The fact that the evidence was
insufficient to convict the principal did not absolve the aider and abettor of
3 6
guilt for his participation in the crime.
Although the Standefer panel had ample Third Circuit precedents to support its holding, it felt that the issue deserved more consideration. The Third
Circuit therefore ordered rehearing en banc in order to reconsider its holdings in
these cases.
As previously indicated, the en banc majority held that Congress intended
for 18 U.S.C. section 2 to allow conviction of the aider and abettor notwithstanding acquittal of the principal. In order to lend support to their decision, the Standefer court cited the decisions of other circuits on the same issue.
The majority characterized its decision as adherence to "the clear majority
position. " 37 In support of its assertion, the court cited cases from eight circuits,
which it claimed stand for the proposition that acquittal of the sole principal
does not preclude conviction of an aider and abettor.3 8 In addition, the majority noted that its view is also in accord with that of the Model Penal Code3 9 and
40
that favored by most commentators.
According to the court's interpretation, most of the cases reaching conclusions contrary to its own stood simply for the proposition that the government
must prove every element of a crime in order to sustain a conviction. The
distinguishing feature of those cases, reasoned the court, was that the government failed to come forth with adequate proof of the fact that the substantive
33

Id. at 380.

34 334 F.2d 678 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
35 483 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1973).
36 Id. at 94.
37 610 F.2d at 1086.
38 See United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98, 118-19 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1019 (1972);
United States v. Bryan, 483 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1973) (en banc); United States v. Musgrave, 483 F.2d 327,
331-32 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Kelley, 258 F. 392, 402 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 249 U.S. 616 (1919);
Pigman v. United States, 407 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (9th Cir.
1971); United States v. Coppola, 526 F.2d 764, 776 (10th Cir. 1975); Gray v. United States, 260 F.2d 483
(D.C. Cir. 1958).
39 "An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity
therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or
has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has immunity to prosecution or conviction or
has been acquitted." Model Penal Code S 2.06(7).
40 See, e.g., PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW, ch. 6, § 8 (1969); 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE,
116 (1957); 21 AM. JR. 2d Crim. Law, § 128 (1965).
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criminal act had been committed. 41 Apparently, the Standefer majority reasoned that if the government had been able to prove the corpus delicti of the offenses, conviction of the aider and abettor may have resulted notwithstanding
acquittal of the principal.
B. Analysis: Case Authority

The decision in Standefer is in accord with the position of a majority of the
circuits that have addressed this issue, although there is no clear consensus
among the circuits as a whole. 42 Many of the cases cited by the majority in support of its position were decided in different factual contexts, and therefore do
not support the specific holding of Standefer.43
The Standefer decision, however, is clearly the rule in at least four circuits.
As previously indicated, the Standefer court followed a line of precedent initiated
more than thirty years earlier" which established that regardless of the fact that
the actual principal had been acquitted, the aider and abettor could still be
45
charged with the substantive offense.
46
In United States v. Musgrave, the Fifth Circuit adopted the same position
when it unequivocally held that acquittal of the only possible principal does not
preclude ihe conviction of an aider and abettor. The court indicated that a verdict of "not guilty" did not necessarily mean that the particular principal or
specific act was innocent, but rather, only that insufficient evidence was
developed at the first trial to establish the principal's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Thus, the conviction of an aider and abettor would not necessarily pro47
duce an inconsistency.
In Pigman v. United States,48 the Eighth Circuit ruled that in order to sustain
a conviction of one charged as an aider and abettor it was necessary that there
be evidence showing an offense to have been committed by a principal, and
41

610 F.2d at 1087.

42 The Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue. The Court, however, has dealt with aiders
and abettors in a related context. In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 373 U.S. 262 (1963), two Negro
ministers were tried and convicted of aiding and abetting a violation of a criminal trespass ordinance for
their part in the organization of a sit-down strike. The convictions of the principals were held constitutionally invalid. Nevertheless, the defendants were still charged as aiders and abettors. The Supreme Court held
that there could be no conviction for aiding and abetting someone to do an innocent act. Id. at 265.
43 Two of the cases that the Standefer Court cited in support of its position, United States v. Coppola,
526 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1975), and United States v. Deutsch, 451 F.2d 98 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1019 (1972), involved plea bargains by the principal. In those cases the principals pleaded guilty to
lesser included offenses or to other counts of the indictments. In such contexts, the courts approved convictions of aiders and abettors. 526 F.2d at 776; Deutsch, 451 F.2d at 118-19. The fact that plea bargains were
made as a result ofcompromise, and not necessarily with respect to the guilt or innocence of the principal in
regard to a particular charge, however, removes such cases from the context involved herein.
Another case cited by the majority, United States v. Azadian, 436 F.2d 81 (9th Cir. 1971), should be
also distinguished. In Azadian, the sole reason for the principal's acquittal was that she was entrapped by a
government agent. The principal's acquittal was thus predicated not on her innocence, but rather on the
fact that there was overreaching on the part of a government agent. The rule in the Ninth Circuit requires a
defendant to admit the criminal act before he can successfully assert a defense of entrapment. Thus, the
defense merely grants immunity from prosecution for criminal acts concededly committed. It does not
establish innocence per se. Id. at 83. For this reason, the case should not have been cited by the Standefer
court in support of its holding.
44

United States v. Klass, 166 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1948).

45
46
47
48

Id. at 380.
483 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973).
483 F.2d at 331.
407 F.2d 237 (8th Cir. 1969).
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also that the principal was aided and abetted by the accused. If the aider and
abettor was proven to have assisted in the crime, the court would not be compelled to acquit him merely because of insufficient evidence against the prin49
cipal at the first trial.
Finally, in Van Patzoll v. United States,50 the Tenth Circuit recognized that
conviction of the principal was not a prerequisite to conviction of the aider and
abettor. The court stated that the acquittal of the principal presented no impediment to the trial and conviction of a person charged with aiding and abetting the commission of the crime. So long as the proof established that a crime
was committed, and that the person charged with aiding and abetting assisted
51
in its commission, his conviction could be upheld.
These precedents clearly held that acquittal of the sole principal does not
preclude conviction of an aider and abettor. The decisions rely on the fact that
different trials may produce different results. In a separate trial context, the
defendant is required to support himself, not rely on the outcome of the trial of
another defendant. The four circuits followed this common reasoning in
holding that the principal's acquittal was immaterial with respect to the decision concerning the aider and abettor.
On the other hand, at least two circuits have indicated that acquittal of the
principal will preclude conviction of an aider and abettor. In Girogasian v.
United States,5 2 the First Circuit held that where the evidence was insufficient to
convict the principal, a bank's branch manager, of willful misapplication of
bank funds in an earlier trial, the defendant could not be found guilty of aiding
and abetting the manager. According to the First Circuit, in order to convict
one of aiding and abetting it was necessary that the prosecution first prove that
53
the principal himself was guilty of the substantive offense.
The Fourth Circuit is also clearly in conflict with the rule set down in
Standefer. In two cases, United States v. Shuford 4 and United States v. Prince,55 the
court held that where the only potential principal had been acquitted, the acquittal established that no crime has been committed, and therefore the convic5 6
tion of an aider and abettor must be set aside.
Several other circuits have indicated that where the two parties are tried
together, the aider and abettor cannot be convicted without the conviction of
the principal. In United States v. Bernstein,5 7 the Second Circuit stated that since
"it is the law that a person cannot be found guilty of aiding and abetting unless
a principal whom he has aided and abetted committed the criminal act,"58 it
was not error for the judge to instruct the jury that the aider and abettor could
not be convicted unless the principal was also convicted. The Seventh Circuit
in United States v. Stevison5 9 affirmed a similar jury instruction under the ra49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 239.
163 F.2d 216 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947).
163 F.2d at 219.
349 F.2d 166 (lst Cir. 1965).
Id. at 167.
454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971).
450 F.2d 1324 (4th Cir. 1970).
454 F.2d at 779; Prince, 430 F.2d at 1325.
533 F.2d 775 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976).
533 F.2d at 799.

59

471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973).
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tionale that it was "invalid" to presuppose that
an aider and abettor could be
60
convicted absent conviction of the principal.
Although no consensus has been reached among the circuits a disturbing
feature common to most of these cases is that the courts have not discussed the
reasoning behind their holdings. In the usual situation, the court will merely
set forth a principle of law and cite supporting authority. The cases are decided
on the basis of other decisions, not statutory interpretation or policy considerations. Thus, the Third Circuit's analysis in Standefer stands as the only in-depth
discussion of the reasoning for denial of acquittal of an aider and abettor when
the principal is found not guilty.
V. Policy Considerations
A. General Policy Factors
When the legislative intent of an act is not easily ascertainable and
precedents are divergent, policy considerations become very important. In
Standefer, therefore, the Third Circuit identified and discussed the various effects that the two possible interpretations of 18 U.S.C. section 2 would have on
the federal system of criminal justice.
The court first recognized that if 18 U.S.C. section 2 were interpreted to
allow conviction of an aider and abettor despite acquittal of the principal, the
61
law would tolerate, if not promote, the existence of inconsistent verdicts.
Such logical inconsistency, the court noted, might lead to public distrust in, or
62
disrespect for, the federal judicial system.
In deciding to adopt the interpretation which would allow potential inconsistency, however, the majority argued that a rule that would allow inconsistent results in separate trials pertaining to the same transaction does not
necessarily defy logic. 63 The cornerstone of their argument was that no two
trials are alike in all respects. In many cases the proof available and actually
used by the prosecution will vary, depending upon who is being prosecuted and
when the prosecution is brought.6 4 Different defense strategies, for instance,
may result in the use of different witnesses or a different emphasi' in
testimony. 6 5 Evidence that was inadmissible against the principal may be admissible against an aider and abettor.66 If there is a substantial time difference
between the trials of the defendants, a key witness may be unavailable for the
second trial. 67 The possibility also exists that new evidence may be obtained
against an aider and abettor that was either unknown or unavailable to the
prosecution at the time of the principal's trial. 68 The Standefer majority argued
60
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471 F.2d at 147-48.
610 F.2d at 1088-89.
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Id. at 1093.
Id. at 1089.

64 Id.
65 Id.
66 For example, a defendant normally has standing to raise violations of his own constitutional rights,
but no standing to raise those of others. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72 (1969); Brown v.
United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
67 610 F.2d at 1089.
68 See United States v. Musgrave, 483 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1023 (1973).
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that the realities of criminal trials should not require that two juries, 69
presented
with essentially different fact situations, reach the same conclusion.
The court further explained that a verdict of "not guilty" is not necessarily the equivalent of a finding of innocence.7 0 A verdict of "not guilty" may, in
some instances, indicate only that insufficient evidence was developed at the
first trial to establish the principal's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. It does
not necessarily mean that the particular principal was innocent or that the
71
specific act was not committed.
The principal argument advanced for precluding conviction of an aider
and abettor where the principal has been acquitted is that a contrary holding
would impair "the appearance of evenhandedness in the administration of
justice.' '72 The cornerstone of this argument is that the public will neither
understand nor accept a situation in which the courts rule that the substantive
crime was not committed although the defendant aided and abetted in its commission. 73 Thus, public confidence in the judicial system may be diminished by
those cases in which the principal escapes punishment while the aider and abettor is convicted and sentenced, because the result seems logically
inconsistent. 74
The majority acknowledged that confidence in the fairness and integrity of
the judicial system is, to some extent, diminished in those cases where the principal escapes punishment while the aider and abettor is convicted and sentenced.7 5 Their position, however, was that the perception of evenhandedness,
except in the unusual case, is not an overriding concern. 76 Turning the "loss of
confidence" argument around, the majority argued that the public would be
disillusioned in those cases in which the guilt of the aider and abettor is confessed or conclusively proven at his own trial and yet his conviction is precluded due to the acquittal of the principal. In such cases, the public would be more
appalled by the failure to prosecute than by the "logical inconsistency" of doing
so.77 In either situation the public will be confused. In one case, the government is apparently prosecuting someone for assisting in a crime that was never
committed. In the other, the government apparently allows a guilty defendant
to go free. The only realistic way of dealing with the problem of public perception is therefore to provide better information about the realities of our criminal
justice system. Since the Third Circuit rule is not in fact logically inconsistent,
it should not be changed merely because it may appear at first glance to be so.
In Standefer, the court was justifiably concerned with the possibility that
guilty defendants would be allowed to go free by a rule that acquittal of the
principal precludes conviction of an aider and abettor. The majority argued
that the public interest would not be served by a rule that allows aiders and
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610 F.2d at 1089.
Id. at 1095.
See United States v. Musgrave, 483 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1073 (1973).
610 F.2d at 1104 (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting).
Id. at 1105 (Aldisert, J., concurring and dissenting).
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abettors to escape responsibility for their criminal
activity merely because the
78
respective principals have escaped punishment.
In some situations, the prosecution of a defendant will be hampered by
rules requiring the exclusion of evidence. Judicial adoption of the "exclusionary rule" is premised on the notion that it serves to deter unlawful police
practices as well as enhance the security of all citizens although, in some contexts, it may allow the guilty defendant to go unpunished. Unlike the situation
in which the "exclusionary rule" is invoked in order to preserve the rights and
liberties of all people, however, a rule requiring acquittal of the aider and abettor would not protect the rights of others. Since the issue does not implicate the
rights of others, the Standefer court did not feel compelled to alter their rule.
The majority also argued that a rule precluding the conviction of an aider
and abettor where the principal was acquitted would unjustly give the aider
and abettor "two bites at the apple." 79 The argument was premised on the notion that the aider and abettor is given the opportunity to prevail in either of
two trials; the principal's or his own. 80 The aspect found most objectionable by
the majority was the possibility that the aider and abettor could prevail
vicariously, no matter how strong the evidence was against him at his own
trial, due to some unforeseen development at the principal's trial. 8 1 When
viewed in context with the fact that separate trials can logically produce inconsistent results, and that a verdict of not guilty is not the equivalent of a finding
of innocence, the argument is well-taken.
Interestingly, the "two bites at the apple" argument can also be used to
attack the Standefer interpretation. Judge Gibbons, in an opinion in Standefer in
which he concurred in part and dissented in part, argued that where the
government has had a full and fair opportunity to prove its case against the
principal, any fact which was determined against it in that trial should be applied in the aider and abettor's favor in a subsequent trial.82 This concept,
known as nonmutual collateral estoppel, is premised at least in part on the
theory that the government, having lost once, should not be given a second opportunity to litigate the same factual issues in a subsequent trial.8 3 The question of applicability of this concept in the aider and abettor context therefore
became an important element in the court's evaluation of public policy concerns in Standefer.
B. Applicability of Nonmutual CollateralEstoppel
At the outset, nonmutual collateral estoppel should be distinguished from
collateral estoppel. Collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of
ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final judgement, that
issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future
lawsuit.' '84 In the criminal context the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
78
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amendment prohibits the government from trying a defendant twice for the
same crime. 85 The double-jeopardy provision has also been applied to prohibit
the government from relitigating, at a subsequent trial on different charges,
issues of fact decided in a defendant's favor at a prior trial.8 6 The government
is therefore collaterally estopped from challenging the prior findings. Absent
mutuality of parties, however, the application of collateral estoppel in a
7
criminal context is not constitutionally mandatedA
Judicial adoption of a principle of nonmutual collateral estoppel would
forbid the relitigation of facts already decided against the government at a prior
trial even though the current defendant was not a party at the earlier trial. 88
The "nonmutual" party, the new defendant, would thus receive the benefit of
the findings in a prior trial, while he would not be subject to any negative
holdings.
The Standefer majority provided several reasons for their refusal to adopt
nonmutual collateral estoppel in the aider and abettor situation. First, the
court argued that the use of nonmutual collateral estoppel would create a reluctance on the part of prosecutors to try co-defendants separately. Prosecutors would be more reluctant to grant an aider and abettor's right to a
separate trial if everything decided adversely to the prosecution in the trial of
the principal is denied consideration in a subsequent trial of the aider and
abettor. 89
Secondly, the majority argued that application of nonmutual collateral
estoppel could result in the refusal by the government to prosecute some codefendants at all for fear ofjeopardizing other cases yet to be tried. 90 In order to
avoid the application of -the doctrine, the government would either try the codefendants together or attempt to try the strongest cases first. 9 1 In either case,
the strategy of the prosecution can affect the rights of the defendants.
Finally, the application of nonmutual collateral estoppel in a criminal
prosecution would entail procedural burdens. The court involved in the trial of
the aider and abettor will have to carefully scrutinize the record of the prior
trial involving the principal in order to determine precisely what issues of fact
were determined. 92 In jury cases, verdicts may be internally inconsistent, and
can be the result of confusion, doubt, or compromise. 93 Although Judge Gibbons points out that application of the doctrine imposes no greater burden than
that which is involved in mutual collateral estoppel cases, 94 one might question
whether the added burden is justified in light of the other policy considerations.

85 U.S. Const. amend. V.
86 397 U.S. at 436.
87 Hubbard v. Hatrak, 588 F.2d 414 (3d Cir. 1978).
88 610 F.2d at 1091.
89 Id. at 1094; Hubbard, 588 F.2d at 418.
90 610 F.2d at 1094.
91 Judge Gibbons would not give nonmutual collateral estoppel retroactive effect. Thus, the doctrine
would have no effect on convictions already obtained. However, application of the doctrine in such a way
seems to weaken the strongest argument for nonmutual collateral estoppel, concern for "the appearance of
evenhandedness." The perceived injustice of inconsistent results is not lessened by the order in which such
results are obtained. Id. at 1094.
92 Id. at 1095.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 1110-11 (Gibbons, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Since the use of nonmutual collateral estoppel would entail additional
burdens and the possible infringement of rights, application of the doctrine to
federal criminal cases is improbable. The insistence on separate determinations
of all factual issues is conducive to maintaining individual rights and will
therefore be preserved in federal criminal law.
VI. Conclusion
The Third Circuit's decision in Standefer provides the first comprehensive
look at the question of whether the acquittal of one charged as a sole principal
should preclude conviction of an aider and abettor. The decision provides an
excellent overview of the relevant policy considerations.
A close reading of Standefer reveals that Congress did not address the issue
with their enactment of 18 U.S.C. section 2. Furthermore, there is a split in the
circuits that have dealt with the issue specifically. Confronted with a situation
where the intent of Congress is not easily ascertainable and the applicable
precedents divergent, resolution of the issue becomes dependent upon policy
considerations.
The Standefer majority had argued convincingly that separate trials may
justify a situation where the principal is acquitted and the aider and abettor
convicted. Since a verdict of not guilty is not the equivalent of a finding of innocence, differing verdicts do not necessarily entail consistencies. The realities
of criminal trials should not require that two juries, presented with essentially
different fact situations, reach the same conclusion.
The issue, however, is still largely unresolved in federal criminal law. The
conflicting views among the circuits will ultimately demand final resolution.
Congress or the Supreme Court should therefore resolve this important question of federal law.

